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Abstract 
 
Research question  
How does the response and management 
of terrorist attacks by emergency medical 
services (EMS) in the United Kingdom 
(UK) compare to Europe and the United 
States of America (USA)? 
 
Introduction 
Terrorist attacks and active shooter events 
account for a growing number of mass 
casualty and major incidents in the UK, 
Europe and the USA. In order to better 
prepare for future incidents, analysis of 
prior events is essential.   
 
Methods 
Systematic literature searches of papers 
published between 1/1/2004 and 
5/31/2018 were conducted using two key 
databases: CINAHL Plus and PubMed 
(indexed from MEDLINE). Key contents of 
identified papers were abstracted, 
including EMS response and patient 
management, with emphasis placed upon 
identified recommendations and lessons 
learned. 
 
Results 
Four hundred and forty-two records were 
identified in the preliminary search, with 
176 records further screened using the 
title and abstract. Ten papers were 
included in the final review, reflecting 13 
events from five countries across two 
continents. Three major themes identified 
throughout the papers were emergency 
preparedness, resilience and response 
(EPRR), casualty triage, and tactical 
emergency medical services (TEMS). 
These themes were present in 90%, 70% 
and 40% of the papers respectively.  
 
Conclusion 
New and innovative EMS response 
strategies occurred over the study period, 
in part due to dissemination of lessons 
learned. Despite advances in response to 
mass violence events, significant gaps 
remain, in part due to lack of adoption of 
recommendations. Recent experience 
with advanced TEMS providers capable of 
operating within the inner perimeter 
suggest that this approach should be 
further evaluated as part of the response 
plan for future events. 
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Background 
A “terrorist attack” is the use of violence or 
threats of violence by terrorists to attempt 
to publicise their beliefs and achieve their 
goals, by influencing or exerting pressure 
upon governments (MI5, 2018). In recent 
years, terrorism has evolved to use 
diverse methods of attack, ranging from 
firearms to bladed weapons to vehicular 
assaults to improvised explosive devices. 
Regardless of the mechanism of injury, 
harm inflicted upon innocent civilians has 
been substantial (Rozenfeld et al, 2019). 
Since 2004, more than 24 discrete 
terrorist mass violence events have been 
perpetrated in Europe, ranging from the 
Madrid train bombings to the Manchester 
Arena attack (USA Today, 2016; BBC 
News, 2017). UK security services 
reported thwarting 16 terror plots between 
March 2017 and February 2018 
(Metropolitan Police, 2018).  
 
In addition to terrorist attacks, active 
shooter incidents can produce similar 
deadly results. The U.S. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation defines an active shooter 
incident as “an individual actively engaged 
in killing or attempting to kill people in a 
populated area” (FBI, 2018). According to 
the most recent statistics, 27 active 
shooter events occurred in 2018, resulting 
in 85 fatalities and 128 wounded 
individuals (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2018). 
 
Prior studies have highlighted the need to 
review major incidents, identify common 
themes, and make recommendations for 
policy adoption and response agency 
practice (Moran et al, 2017; Thompson et 
al, 2014). The purpose of the current 
study was to perform a systematic review 
of recent mass violence events and 
establish some fundamental areas for 
improvement. 
 
Methods 
This was a structured database review 
using the online databases CINAHL Plus 
and PubMed. The inclusion dates 1/1/2004 
– 5/31/2018 were selected to capture 
extensive literature on terrorist attacks and 
active shooter events. The decision to limit 
studies to the United Kingdom, Europe, 
and the USA was taken due to similarities 
in societal structure and government 
response. Searches were conducted on 
31st May 2018 into both databases using 
the inclusion criteria listed in Table 1. 
Exclusion factors and the screening 
process have been listed in figure 1 and a 
summary of the literature is reported in 
Table 2. 
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Literature Summary 
Table 2: Literature summary of selected studies for review. 
Citations Event Summary  Key Findings Limitations 
Hunt, P. Lessons 
identified from the 
2017 Manchester 
and London 
terrorism 
incidents. Part 1: 
introduction and 
the prehospital 
phase, (2018). 
Five terrorists killed 
36 people using IEDs, 
vehicles and knives in 
Westminster, London 
Bridge and 
Manchester Arena. 
 
 
 Command and 
control structure is 
critical, with the 
ability to collapse 
and expand as the 
incident 
progresses.  
 Triage proved 
challenging due to 
the unsafe nature 
of the scenes. 
Over triage and 
changes in patient 
priority happened 
before arriving at 
hospital.  
 Multi-agency 
collaboration and 
training exercises 
are factors for a 
successful 
response.  
 Logistical issues, 
particularly 
stretchers, were a 
significant 
response 
constraint at 
Manchester Arena. 
 Patients self-
presented at 
hospitals via 
private vehicles or 
police transport 
prior to EMS 
arrival, thereby 
impeding attempts 
at MCI triage.   
Sole author not 
involved in 
response. 
Qualitative 
methodologies. 
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Bobko, J., Sinha, 
M., Chen, D. et al, 
A Tactical 
Medicine After-
action Report of 
the San 
Bernardino 
Terrorist Incident, 
(2018).  
In 2015, two terrorists 
carried out a 
marauding terrorist 
firearms attack 
(MTFA), killing 17 
people and injuring 
over 30. IEDs were 
placed but not 
detonated.  
 TEMS were 
training nearby at 
the time of the 
incident and 
entered the hot 
zone alongside 
tactical units, 
performing triage 
and life-saving 
interventions.  
 Command posts 
were set up within 
discovered IED 
blast radii, 
requiring relocation 
and causing 
disruption to the 
tactical operation 
 Rescue Task 
Force (RTF) 
enabled warm 
zone operations 
and augmented 
TEMS personnel; 
SWAT medic. The 
combination of 
TEMS and RTF 
enabled synergistic 
operations 
throughout the 
event.  
 The first patients to 
arrive at medical 
facilities were by 
brought by police, 
not EMS. 
Data was collected 
via an 
unstructured after-
action review, 
rather than 
structured debriefs 
of all involved 
personnel.  
Qualitative 
methodologies.  
Carli, P., Pons, F., 
Levraut, J. et al, 
The French 
emergency 
medical services 
after the Paris and 
Nice terrorist 
In 2015, 137 people 
died and over 400 
were injured during a 
multisite terrorist 
attack in Paris. In 
2016, an 18-wheel 
heavy goods vehicle 
struck hundreds of 
 In the aftermath of 
the Paris attack, 
civilian EMS 
responders 
consulted with 
military medical 
services for 
education and staff 
training, including 
Limited details. 
Qualitative review. 
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attacks: what have 
we learnt? (2017). 
people, killing 87 and 
injuring 458 in Nice.   
damage control 
resuscitative 
concepts and ‘care 
under fire’ 
awareness.  
Service Médical 
du RAID., Tactical 
emergency 
medicine: lessons 
from Paris 
marauding 
terrorist attack, 
(2016). 
In 2015, three 
terrorists entered the 
Bataclan theatre and 
murdered 89 civilians 
using military grade 
firearms and IEDs. A 
specialist law 
enforcement team, 
RAID (research, 
assistance, 
intervention, 
deterrence), 
immediately 
responded to the 
Bataclan theatre 
scene. 
 TEMS physicians 
successfully 
operated within the 
inner perimeter, 
performing triage 
and life-saving 
interventions.  
 A pile of dead 
bodies may have 
obstructed 
identification and 
access to living 
patients with 
potentially 
survivable injuries. 
 A shortage of 
stretchers led to 
casualties being 
removed from the 
area on crowd 
barriers. 
 By the time civilian 
EMS teams were 
granted access, all 
surviving 
casualties had 
been extricated.  
Qualitative review. 
Potential bias in 
favour of authors’ 
methods.  
Gates, J., Arabian, 
S., Biddinger, P. et 
al, The Initial 
Response to the 
Boston Marathon 
Bombing: Lessons 
Learned to 
Prepare for the 
Next Disaster, 
(2014). 
At the 2013 Boston 
Marathon, terrorists 
planted two IEDs 
near the finish line 
(where the medical 
tents were located). 
Both detonated in 
quick succession, 
killing 3 and injuring 
281 people.  
 
 Due to the nature 
of the event 
(ground-level 
IEDs), many 
casualties 
sustained injuries 
amenable to 
tourniquet use.  
 Rapid extraction to 
hospitals trained 
and prepared to 
manage surges of 
Qualitative 
methodologies. No 
structured 
interviews.  
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severely injured 
casualties is critical 
to patient survival. 
Sollid, S., 
Rimstad, R., 
Rehn, M. et al, 
Oslo government 
district bombing 
and Utøya island 
shooting July 22, 
2011: The 
immediate 
prehospital 
emergency 
medical service 
response, (2012). 
In 2011, a lone 
terrorist in Norway 
killed 77 people using 
a vehicle-borne IED, 
and later carried out 
an MTFA on an 
isolated island. 
 
 
 The light 
emergency 
stretcher system 
(LESS), part of the 
disaster plan, 
proved highly 
effective in the 
extraction of large 
numbers of 
casualties.  
 No civilian medics 
were permitted 
access to the 
VBIED hot zone 
and were denied 
access to the 
island for an 
extended period.  
 Prior to the event. 
no triage system 
existed for major 
incident situations.  
 
Structured data 
collection. Limited 
data sources. 
Wild, J., Maher, J., 
Frazee, R. et al, 
The Fort Hood 
Massacre: 
Lessons learned 
from a high profile 
mass casualty. 
(2012). 
In 2009, an active 
shooter incident 
occurred at Fort 
Hood, Texas. Over a 
period of 10 minutes, 
11 people were killed 
and over 30 were 
injured.  
 Scene safety was 
a significant 
concern, due to 
conflicting 
information about 
location and 
number of 
attackers. 
 Scene safety 
concerns 
compromised 
patient triage. 
 Patients were 
transport by private 
vehicles rather 
than EMS, further 
impacting triage. 
Qualitative 
methodologies. 
On-going criminal 
investigation at the 
time of publication 
limited contents.  
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 To improve MCI 
response, regional 
training exercises 
and post-event 
debriefing sessions 
are required.  
Kaplowitz, L., 
Reece, M., 
Hershey, J. et al, 
Regional health 
system response 
to the Virginia 
Tech mass 
casualty incident, 
(2007).  
In 2007, a single 
active shooter 
attacked a university, 
killing 32 students 
and injuring 26.  
 
 
 Scene safety 
remained a 
significant concern 
throughout the 
event.  
 Two TEMS medics 
were able to follow 
law enforcement 
teams into the hot 
zone to initiate 
treatment and 
stabilisation of 
victims.  
 Due to the high 
proportion (67%) of 
seriously injured 
patients, emphasis 
was placed on 
rapid extraction 
and transport 
rather than triage.  
 Mass over-triage 
subsequently 
occurred, which 
led to a strain on 
down-stream 
hospital resources. 
Qualitative 
analysis.  
Lockey, D., 
Mackenzie, R., 
Redhead, J. et al, 
London bombings 
July 2005: the 
immediate pre-
hospital medical 
response., (2005). 
In 2005, three 
terrorists detonated 
IEDs on the London 
Underground System, 
while a fourth terrorist 
detonated his bomb 
on a double decker 
bus in central 
London. This resulted 
in the deaths of 56 
 On scene 
challenges during 
casualty extraction 
from all 
underground 
locations included 
heat, light, and 
distance from the 
point of explosion 
to the exit.  
Qualitative study. 
Potential bias in 
favour of authors’ 
methods.  
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people and injured 
over 700.  
 
 
 Multiple complex 
scenes led to 
difficulties with 
EMS command 
and control.  
 Scene safety 
concerns led to 
rapid extraction 
and transport of 
seriously injured 
patients. 
Carresi, A., The 
2004 Madrid train 
bombings: an 
analysis of pre-
hospital 
management, 
(2008). 
In 2004, 10 IEDs 
placed on trains in 
Madrid were 
simultaneously 
detonated via mobile 
phones by an 
unknown number of 
terrorists. 191 people 
died as a result of this 
terrorist attack.  
  
 Inadequate 
command and 
control structure 
resulted in 
conflicting orders 
given to EMS 
personnel.  
 On-scene 
confusion led to 
inaccurate 
information 
provided by EMS 
to command and 
control structure.  
 Scene safety 
concerns 
compromised 
patient triage.  
 Only 33% of 
patients were 
transported to 
hospital by 
ambulance, with 
the rest 
transported by 
private vehicle.  
Single author 
analysis. 
Qualitative 
methodologies 
using limited face-
to-face interviews. 
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Results  
Four hundred and forty-two records were 
identified in the preliminary search, with 
176 records further screened using the title 
and abstract. Ten papers were included in 
the final review, reflecting 13 events from 
five countries across two continents (Figure 
1). 
 
Figure 1. PRISMA Diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After data abstraction, three major themes 
were identified (Table 3). These were: 
 
1. Emergency preparedness, 
resilience and response (EPRR) 
with subgenres of multi-agency 
collaboration, disaster planning 
and command principals. Identified 
in 90% of analysed papers. 
2. Triage, including impact of scene 
safety. Identified in 70% of 
analysed papers. 
3. The role of specialised Tactical 
Emergency Medical Services. 
Identified in 40% of analysed 
papers.  
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Table 3. Major Themes in Papers.  
Papers Emergency Preparedness, 
Resilience and Response 
Triage Tactical Emergency 
Medical Services 
Hunt, P., Lessons identified 
from the 2017 Manchester 
and London terrorism 
incidents. Part 1: 
introduction and the 
prehospital phase, (2018). 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
Bobko, J., Sinha, M., Chen, 
D. et al, A Tactical Medicine 
After-action Report of the 
San Bernardino Terrorist 
Incident, (2018). 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
Carli, P., Pons, F., Levraut, 
J. et al, The French 
emergency medical services 
after the Paris and Nice 
terrorist attacks: what have 
we learnt? (2017). 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
Service Médical du RAID., 
Tactical emergency 
medicine: lessons from 
Paris marauding terrorist 
attack, (2016). 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
Gates, J., Arabian, S., 
Biddinger, P. et al, The 
Initial Response to the 
Boston Marathon Bombing: 
Lessons Learned to Prepare 
for the Next Disaster, 
(2014). 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
Sollid, S., Rimstad, R., 
Rehn, M. et al, Oslo 
government district bombing 
and Utøya island shooting 
July 22, 2011: The 
immediate prehospital 
emergency medical service 
response, (2012). 
 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
Wild, J., Maher, J., Frazee, 
R. et al, The Fort Hood 
Massacre: Lessons learned 
from a high profile mass 
casualty, (2012). 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
Official journal of the Australian Tactical Medical Association 
 
 
11 
 
Kaplowitz, L., Reece, M., 
Hershey, J. et al, Regional 
health system response to 
the Virginia Tech mass 
casualty incident, (2007). 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
Lockey, D., Mackenzie, R., 
Redhead, J. et al, London 
bombings July 2005: the 
immediate pre-hospital 
medical response, (2005). 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
Carresi, A., The 2004 
Madrid train bombings: an 
analysis of pre-hospital 
management, (2008). 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
✔ 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Emergency Preparedness, Resilience, 
and Response (EPRR) 
The London bombings of July 2005, which 
struck three underground trains and one 
bus, killing 54 people and injuring over 
700, demonstrates the sheer complexity of 
managing four simultaneous mass 
casualty sites. Command systems were 
severely stretched as a result of patient 
numbers and locations, and ambulance 
commanders were posted to the control 
room to act as a central command source. 
Patients emerged from different 
underground stations (Kings Cross and 
Russell Square), leading to mistaken 
assumptions of two sperate incidents at 
these locations. Unfortunately, the 
increasingly mobile nature of these events 
makes multiple site control an increasing 
reality, and one that must be planned for. 
 
The Madrid train bombings of 2004 
similarly involved multiple IEDs detonated 
on 10 trains during rush hour, resulting in 
191 killed and more than 2000 injured. 
Command and control was identified as 
an area for improvement in the response 
to this event. Responders stated that the 
sheer confusion caused by the magnitude 
of patients across a large area 
overwhelmed on scene ambulance 
commanders. A breakdown in command 
from the operations centre meant 
ambulance units were not reaching their 
destinations. In both Madrid and London, 
responding units were diverted to other 
locations, without necessarily informing 
control centres. In contrast, although more 
limited in scale, command and control at 
the San Bernadino MTFA was improved 
by the presence of on-scene command 
assets and shared tactical decision 
making. 
 
Further confounding initial on scene 
confusion and concerns regarding scene 
safety were frequently noted, leading to 
compromised decision-making in triage 
and patient care. Scene safety was a key 
factor in the overall response to the 
injured in the classrooms and buildings of 
Virginia Tech, based upon uncertainty 
over shooter location. Similarly, Wild et al 
(2012) describes the chaos of on-scene 
operations at the Fort Hood shooting. 
Unconfirmed reports and confusing 
statements led responders to believe the 
presence of multiple active shooters, 
leaving commanders to make difficult 
decisions about triage and transportation. 
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In contrast, sometimes the threat is 
underestimated. During the London Bridge 
attack, some initial calls suggested a 
simple traffic accident, resulting in 
responders being unaware of the actual 
threat, compromising scene safety. Similar 
findings have been noted in analyses in 
the United States, in which more than 
15% of calls failed to relay a safety risk 
concern to responding EMS personnel 
(Klassen et al, 2018). Command 
structures must anticipate this “fog of war” 
and make decisions to mitigate the 
confusion. On-scene command and 
control may assist with this. 
 
Direct threats from gunmen are not the 
sole concern for responding crews. During 
the San Bernardino MTFA, lack of IED 
awareness resulted in the tactical 
command post and casualty collection 
point being located within the blast radius. 
Furthermore, the IEDs were only 
discovered during extrication of patients 
from the building by conventional EMS. 
This incident serves to highlight the 
adoption of militarised tactics even by 
active shooters (Bobko et al, 2018). 
Additional threats noted include risk of 
structural collapse, toxic atmospheres, 
contamination, and situational risks such 
as live rails (Lockey et al, 2005; Hunt, 
2018). 
 
Logistical concerns frequently impact the 
response to mass violence events. One 
frequently identified area for improvement 
is the means by which non-ambulatory 
casualties can be rapidly extracted. During 
both the 2015 multi-site MTFA in Paris 
and the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, 
responding emergency services were 
faced with a lack of available stretchers 
(Hunt, 2018; Service Médical du Raid, 
2016; kerslakearenareview, 2018). As a 
result, patients were extracted from the 
point of injury on makeshift stretchers 
such as crowd control barriers. Although 
mass casualties were encountered by 
responders in Oslo and Utoya Island, 
Norwegian EMS teams have developed a 
light emergency stretcher system (LESS) 
as part of major incident preparedness. Air 
ambulances transported LESS, which 
contains 5 light stretchers in a single bag, 
to the scenes at Utoya Island and Oslo 
(Sollid et al, 2012).  
 
On-going major incident training is critical 
in responding to these extreme events. 
Lockey et al (2005) noted that an 
emergency services exercise was 
conducted on the London Underground 
network shortly prior to 7/7 as a 
preparedness response to the Madrid train 
bombings of 2004, which may have 
helped mitigate some of the issues noted 
in Madrid. Similarly, Manchester 
emergency services drilled a terrorist 
bombing attack months prior to the 
Manchester Arena incident as a direct 
response to events in France (Hunt, 2018; 
kerslakearenareview, 2018). Multiple US 
authors praised training exercises as an 
invaluable resource. EPRR elements 
should be a key aspect of such training.  
 
Given the complexities of responding to 
mass violence events, multi-agency 
collaboration is a critical factor for 
successful response. Both Hunt (2018) 
and Carli et al (2017) note the utility of 
military assistance to civilian authorities, 
both from an educational and operational 
perspective. Knowledge translation of 
military injury patterns and appropriate 
treatments, including tourniquets and 
other elements of damage control 
resuscitation, to the civilian sector is 
critical for future response at both the 
prehospital and hospital levels (King, 
2019; Cannon, 2018).   
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Hunt (2018) noted how responders were 
at risk by quaternary factors such as 
structural debris (as witnessed during 7/7); 
showing the consistency in bombing 
characteristics. However, it is worth 
highlighting the success of the response 
due to the availability of specialist 
resources such as advanced paramedics 
and the Hazardous Area Response Team 
(HART).  
 
HART was developed in the wake of 7/7, 
realising the demand for a special unit to 
respond to these types of threatening 
environments. With the ability to operate 
within the warm zone of an MTFA, HART 
was utilised to extricate patients to the 
cold zone where ordinary paramedics had 
erected a casualty clearing station and 
command point (NARU, 2018). These 
actions made by the commanders and 
paramedics on the night were correct in 
adhering to the well-established policies. 
The Joint Emergency Services 
Interoperability Program (JESIP) was 
developed in 2013 and offers command 
and control principals in which police, fire 
and rescue and ambulance services now 
practise (JESIP, 2017). These command 
principals may have contributed to the 
success of the management by the 
ambulance service at Manchester arena. 
On the contrary, few ambulance personnel 
volunteered to enter the hot zone and 
commence the triage of patients. This is 
against conventional practice in the UK, 
however, the police authorised the access 
due to the perception of there being 
minimal threat. These actions by the 
personnel were directly credited by Lord 
Kerslake, chairman and author of the 
Kerslake Report evaluating this terrorist 
attack. Kerslake continues to show 
admiration for the ambulance service, as 
patients were treated and transported 
incredibly effectively, with only 1 patient 
requiring a secondary transfer 
(kerslakearenareview, 2018). These 
points echo the fluidity of operations in 
regard to scene safety, zoning, command 
structure and decision-making.  
 
Triage 
Triage refers to the rapid sorting of 
casualties, with the intent of doing “the 
most for the most.” Triage has been noted 
to be an issue at almost every mass 
casualty incident, often due to lack of 
systems-knowledge or lack of ability to 
perform due to concern for on-going 
threats. Although numerous triage 
systems exist, the best triage system 
remains unclear and is continually 
debated (Vasallo, Smith and Wallis, 2018; 
Silvestri et al, 2017).  
 
At the Madrid train bombings, EMS crews 
were unable to use the existing triage 
system due to both a lack of knowledge 
and a lack of triage tags (Carresi, 2008). 
Similar issues with triage were noted in 
the Norway attacks. At the time, 
Norwegian EMS had no national triage 
system, and so responders defaulted to 
the primary survey consisting of 
catastrophic haemorrhage, airway, 
breathing, circulation, disability and 
exposure in order to identify critical 
patients (Sollid et al, 2012). Although a 
formal triage system was lacking in this 
response, the ad hoc approach was still 
successful as no patients died on their 
way to hospital. A standardised triage 
system might minimise errors in casualty 
prioritisation. As highlighted by the 
Manchester Arena attack, responders 
should prepare to triage and treat large 
numbers of pediatric casualties which 
poses as a unique challenge.  
 
In contrast to lack of knowledge, scene 
safety concerns limited use of triage 
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systems at several events, with resultant 
over- and under-triage. During both Fort 
Hood and Virginia Tech, a decision was 
made to prioritise rapid transportation in 
precedence to over accurate triage. Even 
in circumstances where triage was 
performed appropriately by EMS 
providers, patients were transported to 
hospitals by private vehicles or law 
enforcement, arriving unannounced. 
Hospitals should anticipate and plan for an 
initial wave of victims arriving outside the 
EMS system, especially where hospitals 
are in close proximity to the point of injury. 
This may particularly impact specialty or 
general hospitals not equipped to manage 
major trauma patients, as witnessed by a 
children’s hospital near to the Nicé lorry 
attack site. 
 
Tactical Emergency Medical Services 
Tactical emergency medical services 
(TEMS) involves the incorporation of 
specially trained medical assets into police 
or paramilitary tactical units. Traditionally 
associated with US Special Weapons and 
Tactics (SWAT) teams, it more recently 
has been adopted and advanced by 
European counterparts. TEMS was 
specifically noted to be a key component 
of the medical response in four papers.   
 
During the response to the Virginia Tech 
shooting, EMS were denied access to the 
scene during the period of on-going threat. 
Two tactical medics attached to 
responding law enforcement teams were 
deployed to the hot zone (Kaplowitz et al, 
2007). The medics were able to begin 
triaging the wounded, perform life-saving 
interventions, and prepare the casualties 
for extraction, prior to the arrival of 
conventional EMS. These key actions 
contributed to the success of the 
prehospital response. 
 
During the San Bernardino MTFA, a 
perimeter was established which 
prevented responding EMS units entering 
to gain immediate access to victims. 
Current US law enforcement doctrine 
defines an active shooter event as a patrol 
level response, in contrast to a SWAT 
response, in order to minimise response 
delays. Serendipitously, a local SWAT 
team was training nearby and so was able 
to rapidly deploy to the scene. The tactical 
medic proceeded to triage and treat the 
casualties in the hot zone, performing 
initial lifesaving interventions. As the 
TEMS provider carries only limited 
supplies, the TEMS response was 
subsequently augmented by a secondary 
Rescue Task Force (RTF) response in the 
warm zone (Bobko et al, 2018). 
 
The RTF is a joint law enforcement-
medical response, in which law 
enforcement provides security to medical 
personnel who rapidly treat and extract 
casualties. The medical component of the 
RTF model can be most comparable to 
the newly developed Hazardous Area 
Response Team (HART) in the UK. Both 
teams are trained to enter the warm zone 
and initiate treatment and extract patients 
to the cold zone where conventional EMS 
awaits. The UK currently lacks both 
civilian medical response in the hot zone 
and consistent security for medical teams 
in the warm zone, which may limit efficacy 
of HART.  
 
Most US TEMS providers are trained at 
either the paramedic or EMT level. 
Physician integration is unusual. In 
contrast, French TEMS has advanced the 
process by consistent physician 
integration (Service Médical du RAID, 
2016; Carli et al, 2017). During the 
Bataclan siege, tactical physicians 
supporting SWAT teams from Service 
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Médical du RAID were able to enter the 
concert hall downstairs while the terrorists 
were barricaded upstairs. Physicians were 
able to direct triage and extraction, a 
process made difficult by piles of dead 
bodies, often covering living casualties 
with survivable injuries (Service Médical 
du RAID, 2016). Once patients had been 
extracted to the casualty collection point 
(warm zone), advanced medical 
procedures were performed. By the time 
civilian EMS crews were allowed forward 
into the building, every single living patient 
located in the hot zone had already been 
extracted to the warm zone. By providing 
life-saving interventions without delay at 
the point of injury, this approach was 
reported to save numerous lives. Whether 
the presence of a physician changes 
outcomes in the hot zone compared with 
paramedics has yet to be determined. 
 
The presence of TEMS provides 
comfortable operations in the hot zone 
and when integrated into tactical teams 
permitted both rapid triage and treatment, 
without placing unnecessary delays on 
first patient contact. None of the UK 
incidents mention provision of medical 
care by police officers or any other 
medical care available to victims inside 
the hot zone. This suggests the presence 
of a potential delay in providing patient 
care, in an environment too hostile for 
conventional EMS teams to operate. This 
grey-area hints that the UK may benefit 
from the addition of a TEMS framework 
similar to that of the USA and France, and 
to that currently found amongst UK special 
operations forces. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Based upon the available data, 
prehospital organisational response to 
mass violence events continues to evolve 
and improve. In response to incidents in 
neighbouring jurisdictions, specific 
exercises have been undertaken to test 
local responses to similar events. Practice 
gaps and necessary changes have been 
identified as part of the after-action review 
process. However, society needs to be 
vigilant and approach such changes with a 
degree of caution, as to prepare for the 
next event rather than the last.  
Despite great strides in preparedness and 
response, there remain opportunities for 
improvement, some of which have been 
previously identified. The lack of casualty 
extraction devices noted in Paris and 
Manchester had previously been 
highlighted in Norway, and a solution 
identified. Even when gaps have been 
identified, they have not always been 
closed. Some identified problems may 
require significant redesign of current 
response systems. For example, the 
impact of scene safety concerns upon 
patient triage has been in part mitigated 
by the use of trained TEMS providers in 
the hot zone in both the US and France. 
This capability does not currently exist in 
the UK.  
The international community continues to 
acknowledge the severity of terrorism and 
the challenges it poses to EMS providers, 
but gaps still remain. Formal study of 
these events is difficult due to the 
unpredictable and chaotic nature of actual 
events and artificialities inherent in drills. 
Continued dissemination of lessons 
learned is critical in developing a robust 
response infrastructure, designed to both 
protect responders and save the lives of 
terror casualties.  
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